Second-Order Arguments, or Do We Still Need Tolerance in the Public Sphere?
Электронный научный архив УРФУ
Информация об архиве | Просмотр оригинала| Поле | Значение | |
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Second-Order Arguments, or Do We Still Need Tolerance in the Public Sphere?
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| Автор |
Loginov, A. V.
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| Тематика |
TOLERANCE
RELIGION RECOGNITION IDENTITY CITIZENSHIP |
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| Описание |
Received 8 October 2019. Accepted 20 December 2019. Published online 6 January 2020.
A number of widely discussed court decisions on cases of insults against religious feelings in Russia, such as the relatively recent “Pokemon Go” case of blogger Ruslan Sokolovsky or the lawsuit filed against an Orthodox priest by Nikolai Ryabchevsky in Yekaterinburg for comparing Lenin with Hitler, make pertinent the question of why toleration becomes so difficult in matters concerning religion. In this paper, I revise the classical liberal concept of toleration (David Heyd, Peter Nicholson, and John Horton), arguing that it is challenged by contemporary philosophers, who see no room for applying this concept in the “domain of identities”. The most prominent case of “primordial” identity, that is, the notion of identity as a given, is the claim of devoted believers for recognition. Should we replace the principle of toleration by the principle of recognition since the latter better corresponds to identity claims? To address this question, in the first part of the article I describe the mechanism of tolerant attitude (Nicholson, Heyd) and in the second part, I analyze the debates about the possibility or impossibility of inner religious toleration (Avishai Margalit, Cary Nederman, and Maxim Khomyakov) and further compare toleration and recognition as normative principles. In the light of the debates I took part in the conference hosted by the University of Southern Denmark in October 2019 as part of the project “Religious Majority/Minority in Public Space in Russia and Northern Europe: Historical-Cultural Analysis”, I come to the conclusion that the principle of toleration is preferable to the principle of recognition because the “second-order” arguments for toleration in a secular state will be universally acceptable (pragmatic argument) and, therefore, the principle of toleration is more logical (analytical argument). Following Peter John’s thesis about minimal recognition embedded in toleration, it may also be concluded that we need a normatively charged idea of citizenship, which could provide us with universal “second-order” foundation. The work was supported by the grant of the Russian Science Foundation (No. 17-18-01194). |
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| Дата |
2020-01-22T14:57:11Z
2020-01-22T14:57:11Z 2019 |
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| Тип |
Article
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion Journal article (info:eu-repo/semantics/article) |
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| Идентификатор |
Loginov A. V. Second-Order Arguments, or Do We Still Need Tolerance in the Public Sphere? / A. V. Loginov // Changing Societies & Personalities. — 2019. — Vol. 3. Iss. 4. — P. 319–332.
2587-6104 2587-8964 (Online) http://elar.urfu.ru/handle/10995/79511 https://elibrary.ru/item.asp?id=41833548 10.15826/csp.2019.3.4.080 |
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| Язык |
en
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| Связанные ресурсы |
Changing Societies & Personalities. 2019. Vol. 3. Iss. 4
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| Издатель |
Уральский федеральный университет
Ural Federal University |
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