Emission tax vs. permit trading under bounded rationality and dynamic markets
Электронный научный архив УРФУ
Информация об архиве | Просмотр оригинала| Поле | Значение | |
| Заглавие |
Emission tax vs. permit trading under bounded rationality and dynamic markets
|
|
| Автор |
Foramitti, J.
Savin, I. van, den, Bergh, J. C. J. M. |
|
| Тематика |
ABATEMENT
AGENT-BASED MODELING CARBON TAX CLIMATE POLICY EMISSION TRADING TRACHINOTUS FALCATUS AUTONOMOUS AGENTS BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH COMMERCE COMPUTATIONAL METHODS AGENT-BASED MODEL BOUNDED RATIONALITY EVALUATION CRITERIA INITIAL ALLOCATIONS MARKET CLEARING PRODUCTION FACTORS PRODUCTION LEVEL TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION ABATEMENT COST DEMAND ANALYSIS EMISSIONS TRADING ENERGY MARKET ENERGY POLICY ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY POLLUTION TAX COSTS |
|
| Описание |
A price on emissions can be achieved through an emission tax or permit trading. The advantages and drawbacks of either instrument are debated. We present an agent-based model to compare their performance under bounded rationality and dynamic markets. It describes firms that face uncertainty about future demand and prices; use heuristic rules to decide production levels, trading prices, and technology adoption; and are heterogeneous in terms of production factors, abatement costs, and trading behavior. Using multiple evaluation criteria and a wide range of parameter values, we find that the main difference between the two policies lies in the fact that permit prices fall after successful abatement. This can lead to higher production levels under permit trading, but can also drive emission-efficient firms out of the market. Scarcity rents under permit trading can further create higher profit rates for firms, the extent of which is shown to depend on the mechanisms for market-clearing and initial allocation. © 2020 Elsevier Ltd
Horizon 2020 Framework Programme, H2020 European Research Council, ERC Russian Science Foundation, RSF, (19-18-00262) Horizon 2020, (741087) Funding text 1: This study has received funding through an ERC Advanced Grant from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement n°741087 ). I.S. acknowledges financial support from the Russian Science Foundation [RSF grant number 19-18-00262 ]. Funding text 2: This study has received funding through an ERC Advanced Grant from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement n?741087). I.S. acknowledges financial support from the Russian Science Foundation [RSF grant number 19-18-00262]. |
|
| Дата |
2024-04-08T11:05:34Z
2024-04-08T11:05:34Z 2022 |
|
| Тип |
Article
Journal article (info:eu-repo/semantics/article) Published version (info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion) |
|
| Идентификатор |
Foramitti, J, Savin, I & van den Bergh, JCJM 2021, 'Emission tax vs. permit trading under bounded rationality and dynamic markets', Energy Policy, Том. 148, 112009. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2020.112009
Foramitti, J., Savin, I., & van den Bergh, J. C. J. M. (2021). Emission tax vs. permit trading under bounded rationality and dynamic markets. Energy Policy, 148, [112009]. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2020.112009 0301-4215 Final All Open Access; Green Open Access https://research.vu.nl/files/233637064/Emission_tax_vs._permit_trading_under_bounded_rationality_and_dynamic_markets.pdf https://research.vu.nl/files/233637064/Emission_tax_vs._permit_trading_under_bounded_rationality_and_dynamic_markets.pdf http://elar.urfu.ru/handle/10995/131176 45181327 10.1016/j.enpol.2020.112009 85096231887 000600550600029 |
|
| Язык |
en
|
|
| Связанные ресурсы |
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/RSF//19-18-00262
|
|
| Права |
Open access (info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess)
|
|
| Формат |
application/pdf
|
|
| Издатель |
Elsevier Ltd
|
|
| Источник |
Energy Policy
Energy Policy |
|